Tag Archives: European Union

France Student Protests and EU Policy: Education, Social Inclusion and Institutional Accountability

POLICY ANALYSIS REPORT

An Applied Policy Brief on the EU Dimensions of the 2026 France Education Crisis.

Policy objective: Strengthen European cooperation on educational quality and social inclusion while respecting national competence, supporting evidence-based investment and protecting the rights of students and citizens.

France’s 2026 student protests raise policy questions extending beyond national education management. Teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms, deteriorating school infrastructure, university admissions difficulties and disputes over public expenditure have placed educational provision at the centre of a wider debate about social inclusion, public-service quality and democratic participation.

For the European Union, the situation presents a policy challenge with several dimensions. Education remains primarily a national responsibility, but disparities in educational opportunity affect social cohesion, skills development, labour-market participation and the ability of young Europeans to participate fully in society. The EU therefore has a legitimate supporting role in encouraging cooperation, facilitating investment, sharing evidence and promoting inclusive education.

The protests also raise questions about the relationship between democratic participation and public order. Peaceful assembly is a fundamental right, while violence against individuals, destruction of property and unlawful conduct require appropriate legal responses. European institutions have an interest in ensuring that these principles are respected consistently, without replacing national judicial and administrative authorities.

The European response should concentrate on five priorities:

  • Improving the quality and accessibility of education through existing European cooperation and funding mechanisms.
  • Supporting investment in school infrastructure, teacher development and digital education.
  • Strengthening student participation and institutional accountability.
  • Protecting fundamental rights and encouraging lawful, proportionate policing.
  • Establishing measurable indicators to assess educational inequalities and the effectiveness of public investment.

The central policy objective should be to help Member States build resilient, inclusive education systems while respecting national competence and democratic accountability.

The French protests have focused on problems including teacher shortages, class sizes reported at approximately 32–36 pupils in some schools, inadequate school facilities and difficulties surrounding access to higher education.

These problems are primarily matters for French national and local authorities. Nevertheless, their implications intersect with several established European policy priorities.

Education contributes to the development of skills, productivity, innovation, employment opportunities and social mobility. Differences in the quality of educational provision can affect the ability of young people to enter higher education, obtain employment and participate in economic and civic life.

The European Union has already established frameworks for cooperation in education through the European Education Area, Erasmus+ and initiatives intended to improve educational quality and inclusion. These mechanisms provide opportunities for Member States to exchange experience, develop joint projects and assess the effectiveness of different policy approaches.

The EU should therefore approach the French situation as an opportunity to strengthen existing cooperation rather than to assume direct responsibility for French schools.

Educational quality as a European social objective

The European Pillar of Social Rights recognises the right to quality and inclusive education, training and lifelong learning.

This objective is relevant to the problems raised during the protests because educational access depends on more than formal enrolment. Students also need functioning facilities, sufficient teaching capacity, appropriate support services and meaningful opportunities to progress into further education.

An EU-level assessment should consequently examine educational quality alongside participation rates. Enrolment figures alone cannot establish whether students receive consistent instruction or whether schools provide an adequate learning environment.

The European Commission should encourage Member States to report comparable information on teacher vacancies, instructional time lost, class sizes, school infrastructure and inequalities in access to educational support.

Such reporting would help identify recurring challenges without requiring the EU to prescribe identical education systems across Member States.

Institutional trust as a European governance concern

In his article “In Delhi or Paris, restoring order cannot replace public trust,” published by Asia Times, Bahauddin Foizee argues that public demonstrations can evolve from disputes over specific policies into broader challenges concerning institutional accountability and public confidence. Although his article examines India and France in different national contexts, the institutional dimension of this argument has relevance for European governance.

For the European Union, the significance lies not in assuming that all national protests have identical causes, but in recognising that the credibility of public institutions depends partly on their ability to explain decisions, respond to legitimate concerns and provide accessible mechanisms for addressing administrative shortcomings.

France’s education-related demonstrations therefore raise a question relevant to European social policy: whether formal public services and consultation mechanisms are sufficiently responsive to the needs of the people they serve. The quality of education is not determined exclusively by national spending commitments, enrolment figures or administrative structures. It is also influenced by whether students, teachers and families can obtain explanations and seek corrective action when essential services fail to meet established standards.

This consideration should inform European cooperation on educational quality. Member States should be encouraged to assess not only whether education services are available, but also whether their institutions are transparent, responsive and capable of correcting deficiencies

Any European response must begin with the division of responsibilities established by the EU treaties.

Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for EU action to support and supplement national education policies while respecting Member States’ responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of their education systems.

Education is therefore a supporting competence. The EU does not possess a general power to determine the staffing levels, class sizes, curricula or administrative structures of French schools.

This distinction has practical consequences.

The EU can support cooperation between education authorities, facilitate teacher mobility, finance eligible projects, encourage the exchange of best practices and promote the recognition of qualifications. It cannot simply order France to recruit a particular number of teachers or impose a uniform national classroom-size limit.

The principle of subsidiarity also requires consideration of whether action at European level offers added value beyond measures that national authorities can implement independently.

Recommended EU approach

European institutions should concentrate on measures where cooperation or common financing can improve outcomes.

  • European Commission: Coordinate education cooperation, support eligible investment and publish comparative assessments.
  • Council of the European Union: Facilitate agreement among Member States on shared priorities and voluntary policy objectives.
  • European Parliament: Exercise its legislative and budgetary responsibilities and scrutinise relevant EU programmes.
  • French national authorities: Remain responsible for school staffing, educational administration, national funding decisions and the implementation of reforms.
  • Regional and local authorities: Identify infrastructure needs, manage eligible projects and monitor school-level outcomes.

This division would allow European involvement without weakening national democratic accountability.

Subsidiarity and institutional accountability

Respect for national competence should not be interpreted as an absence of European interest in institutional accountability. Although the organisation of French schools remains a national responsibility, the EU can encourage Member States to adopt transparent administrative practices and effective consultation arrangements through existing cooperation frameworks.

Bahauddin Foizee’s argument is relevant here because he distinguishes between the formal authority of institutions and the confidence citizens place in them. Applied to the European context, this distinction suggests that the effectiveness of national public institutions should not be assessed exclusively through their legal powers or administrative outputs. Their responsiveness, transparency and capacity to address complaints also matter.

European institutions should therefore promote accountability through comparative reporting, voluntary cooperation and the evaluation of public-service outcomes, without converting these objectives into an attempt to take over national education administration.

One of the most important European policy questions concerns how existing EU financial instruments could complement national investment.

The French government has announced a €4 billion financing envelope for school renovations, alongside measures concerning classroom sizes and higher-education capacity. The effectiveness of these commitments will depend on project selection, financing arrangements and implementation.

European funding should not automatically be assumed to cover the entire programme. Eligibility would depend on the relevant fund, programme rules, national arrangements and the characteristics of individual projects.

Cohesion policy and regional disparities

EU cohesion policy provides a framework for supporting economic, social and territorial development. Depending on programme eligibility, relevant investments may include educational infrastructure, energy efficiency, digital facilities and projects that improve access to services.

European and French authorities should examine whether eligible projects in disadvantaged areas could benefit from existing funding arrangements.

Priority should be given to documented needs rather than to the political visibility of individual schools.

Potential areas for support include:

  • Repairing unsafe or deteriorating educational buildings.
  • Improving sanitation, heating, ventilation and summer temperature management.
  • Upgrading digital infrastructure and accessible learning facilities.
  • Improving educational provision in disadvantaged and remote communities.
  • Developing vocational education facilities linked to regional skills needs.

Any EU contribution should be additional to, or appropriately coordinated with, national funding commitments. It should not be presented as a substitute for France’s own responsibility to finance its education system.

Transparent investment and financial accountability

European institutions should encourage a common approach to reporting education-related investment.

Each funded project should identify its total cost, financing sources, expected completion date, responsible authority and intended beneficiaries.

Reports should distinguish between money allocated, contracts awarded, construction completed and facilities brought into use.

This distinction is essential because a large funding announcement does not, by itself, demonstrate an improvement in educational conditions.

A European monitoring framework could also compare the costs and results of renovation projects across regions and Member States. The objective would be to identify efficient practices and improve the use of public resources.

Public spending transparency and the restoration of confidence

Bahauddin Foizee’s analysis in Asia Times provides an additional institutional consideration for European funding policy: financial constraints should be acknowledged, but they should not become a substitute for explaining public expenditure decisions and engaging with the people affected by them.

For the EU, this means that the transparency of education-related investment should extend beyond the publication of funding allocations. National authorities and relevant implementing bodies should explain how competing priorities are determined, why particular projects receive funding and how the distribution of resources addresses documented educational needs.

Fiscal discipline and public accountability are not mutually exclusive. Member States retain responsibility for their budgetary decisions, but transparent explanations of those decisions can help citizens understand the relationship between available resources, public-service requirements and government priorities.

European funding programmes should therefore encourage beneficiary authorities to publish accessible project information, including the objectives, expected benefits, implementation timetable, financing arrangements and reasons for significant changes or delays. This would help ensure that public investment is evaluated through its actual results rather than the size of financial announcements.

Teacher shortages are not exclusively a French policy concern. Education authorities in different European countries face varying difficulties in recruitment, retention and the distribution of qualified staff.

The EU should support national workforce strategies through information exchange, professional development and mobility initiatives.

European teacher cooperation

Erasmus+ already supports learning mobility, professional development and cooperation between educational institutions.

These mechanisms could be used to strengthen teacher training partnerships, exchange experience in shortage subjects and develop joint programmes for school leadership and professional development.

The EU should also encourage Member States to share comparable information on teacher recruitment, retirement, vacancies, retention and working conditions.

Such information could help identify whether shortages are associated with particular subjects, geographical areas or employment arrangements.

Limits of mobility as a solution

Cross-border recruitment should not be treated as a substitute for sustainable national workforce planning.

Teachers require appropriate qualifications, language proficiency, recognition of professional credentials and familiarity with national curricula and school systems. Increased mobility can support cooperation, but it cannot independently resolve structural shortages.

The most effective European contribution would combine mobility and training opportunities with stronger national recruitment and retention policies.

France should retain responsibility for determining its staffing requirements, employment conditions and recruitment arrangements.

The protests have drawn attention to differences in school conditions and access to educational resources.

For the EU, the relevant policy issue is whether young people have meaningful opportunities to benefit from quality education regardless of their socioeconomic circumstances or geographical location.

Educational disadvantage can be reinforced when students attend schools with persistent teacher vacancies, inadequate facilities or limited access to guidance and support services.

These problems can affect later educational attainment and employment opportunities. However, the scale and distribution of these effects must be established through reliable data rather than inferred from individual reports.

A European education-equity framework

The European Commission should encourage Member States to examine educational outcomes alongside school resources.

Relevant indicators could include:

  • Teacher vacancy and retention rates.
  • Class sizes and instructional time lost.
  • Access to school counsellors and support personnel.
  • Building safety and infrastructure quality.
  • Student attendance and completion rates.
  • Access to vocational and higher education.
  • Differences in outcomes by socioeconomic background and region.

These indicators should be collected using consistent definitions and published with appropriate safeguards for personal data.

Comparative reporting could identify persistent inequalities and help governments evaluate whether targeted funding improves educational access.

Protecting disadvantaged communities

Funding programmes should pay particular attention to communities facing multiple disadvantages.

This does not require identical policies across all Member States. It requires that national and regional programmes identify where needs are greatest and explain how resources are allocated.

European institutions can support this approach through technical assistance, shared evaluation methods and the exchange of effective practices.

The objective should be to improve access to quality education without imposing a single administrative model on Europe’s diverse education systems.

Educational inequality and the risk of institutional distrust

Bahauddin Foizee’s analysis highlights the importance of considering how unresolved public-service deficiencies can affect citizens’ confidence in institutions. In the French case, concerns about educational provision extend beyond individual school conditions to questions about the ability of public authorities to respond to persistent problems.

For European policymakers, this raises an important distinction between the existence of educational inequalities and the institutional response to those inequalities. Disparities may arise from differences in regional resources, staffing conditions, infrastructure and socioeconomic circumstances. However, the credibility of the policy response also depends on whether affected communities can identify the measures being taken and understand how their concerns are being addressed.

European monitoring should therefore consider institutional responsiveness alongside educational outcomes. This could include examining whether disadvantaged communities have accessible consultation channels, whether complaints concerning educational services receive appropriate responses and whether authorities publish progress on corrective measures.

Such an approach would connect the EU’s existing social-inclusion objectives with the broader principle that public institutions should be capable of explaining and correcting shortcomings. It would also help distinguish between a temporary improvement in educational indicators and a more sustained improvement in the relationship between public authorities and the communities they serve.

The planned replacement of Parcoursup creates a separate policy question concerning digital public services, admissions transparency and access to higher education.

The EU has an established interest in digital skills, accessible technology, data protection and cooperation between educational institutions.

However, the design and operation of France’s national admissions system remain primarily French responsibilities.

European cooperation could still contribute in several areas.

Transparency and accessibility

Digital admissions systems should provide clear information about application procedures, eligibility criteria, deadlines and the status of applications.

Applicants should be able to understand the requirements for different courses and access assistance if they encounter technical or administrative difficulties.

The transition to a replacement system should include testing, accessibility assessments, clear communication and procedures for correcting errors.

Data protection and digital rights

Where admissions systems process personal data, the applicable EU data-protection framework must be respected.

Authorities should establish clear responsibilities for data access, storage, security and retention. Any use of automated decision-support systems should be subject to appropriate transparency and accountability arrangements.

European institutions can facilitate the exchange of technical standards and good practices, while France remains responsible for the national system’s implementation.

Access to higher education

A more transparent digital platform cannot resolve shortages of university places on its own.

Admissions reform should therefore be coordinated with higher-education capacity, student accommodation, financial support and academic guidance.

The European contribution should focus on sharing evidence about admissions systems and supporting cooperation where cross-border learning offers clear added value.

Administrative transparency and effective remedies

The institutional-accountability argument advanced by Bahauddin Foizee is also relevant to digital admissions systems. Transparency should not be limited to publishing general admissions criteria or making information available online. Applicants should have meaningful opportunities to understand administrative decisions and seek correction when errors occur.

European cooperation could encourage the development of good practices concerning accessible explanations, complaint procedures, administrative review and the communication of decisions. These measures would be particularly relevant where digital systems are used to manage access to essential public services.

The principle is that technological efficiency should be accompanied by institutional accountability. A digital system may simplify administrative procedures, but its credibility also depends on whether applicants can understand how it operates and obtain an effective response when something goes wrong.

The protests have involved peaceful demonstrations as well as incidents of violence, property damage and confrontations with police.

European policy must distinguish between the protection of peaceful assembly and the lawful response to criminal conduct.

Article 12 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recognises freedom of peaceful assembly and association. Article 14 recognises the right to education.

The Charter binds EU institutions and applies to Member States when they are implementing EU law; it is not a general instrument giving the EU authority over every national policing decision. Broader obligations concerning peaceful assembly also arise under the European Convention on Human Rights, to which all EU Member States are parties.

These legal distinctions matter because European institutions should act within their powers while supporting compliance with applicable fundamental-rights obligations.

Protecting peaceful protest

Public authorities should facilitate peaceful demonstrations and distinguish peaceful participants from individuals responsible for violence.

Restrictions on assemblies and the use of force must comply with applicable law and relevant standards of necessity and proportionality.

Where violence occurs, police responses should focus on preventing harm, protecting bystanders and addressing individual unlawful conduct.

Accountability for police conduct

Allegations of excessive force should be subject to prompt, impartial and effective investigation under the applicable legal framework.

Authorities should publish consistent information on injuries, arrests, detention and investigations, subject to legal and privacy requirements.

The treatment of minors requires particular attention to age, vulnerability and applicable juvenile-justice safeguards.

The European Commission should assess whether specific EU-law obligations are engaged before considering formal action. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights can contribute relevant expertise and comparative evidence within its mandate.

Student participation

The protests also demonstrate the importance of accessible channels for young people to participate in decisions affecting their education.

The EU Youth Strategy and Erasmus+ provide existing frameworks for youth participation, civic engagement and cooperation.

These mechanisms could support exchanges between student representatives, school authorities and youth organisations across Member States.

Such cooperation should complement, rather than replace, national and local consultation mechanisms.

The European distinction between public order and public trust

In his Asia Times article, Bahauddin Foizee argues that the authority of governments to maintain public order does not, by itself, guarantee public confidence in the institutions exercising that authority. His analysis distinguishes between the operational objective of containing demonstrations and the wider responsibility of addressing the grievances that have contributed to public dissatisfaction.

This distinction is particularly relevant to the EU’s approach to democratic participation and fundamental rights. European institutions should not evaluate the handling of protests exclusively through the restoration of public order or the reduction of disruption. They should also consider whether peaceful assembly has been protected, whether allegations of unlawful conduct have been examined and whether the relevant public authorities have maintained meaningful channels of engagement.

For the European Union, this requires a careful balance. The protection of peaceful dissent does not mean accepting violence, property destruction or attacks on individuals. Equally, the occurrence of public disorder does not automatically invalidate the concerns raised by a wider protest movement or remove the responsibility of public institutions to address legitimate policy grievances.

Foizee’s argument also identifies a potential cycle in which protesters interpret containment-focused government responses as evidence that their concerns are being ignored, while authorities increasingly approach continued demonstrations as a security problem. This is a relevant consideration for European policymakers because an approach focused exclusively on immediate disruption may leave the underlying dispute unresolved.

European institutions should therefore encourage Member States to distinguish between peaceful participants and individuals responsible for unlawful conduct, while maintaining appropriate mechanisms for examining complaints and addressing the policy concerns raised through demonstrations. Such an approach would support both the protection of public order and the credibility of democratic institutions.

Institutional accountability as part of democratic participation

The European policy response should also recognise that democratic participation extends beyond the right to demonstrate. It includes the ability of citizens, students and organised groups to raise concerns through established institutions and receive meaningful explanations of public decisions.

Bahauddin Foizee emphasises that institutional credibility depends partly on whether authorities are perceived as capable of correcting mistakes, explaining decisions and providing meaningful avenues for redress. In the European context, this principle supports stronger consultation practices, transparent administrative procedures and effective complaint mechanisms within the limits of national and EU responsibilities.

The EU should encourage Member States to evaluate whether student participation arrangements have a demonstrable influence on policy development. Consultation should not be assessed solely through the number of participants or submissions received. Authorities should also explain which proposals have been considered, what decisions followed and why particular recommendations were accepted or rejected.

This would strengthen the relationship between democratic participation and public administration without creating additional EU powers over national education systems or policing.

Student demonstrations and education-related unrest have also been reported in other European countries.

The existence of parallel demonstrations does not establish that these movements share a single leadership structure or are centrally coordinated. National education systems differ in governance, financing, admissions and labour relations.

Nevertheless, recurring concerns about educational access, public spending and institutional responsiveness create opportunities for European cooperation.

Recommended initiatives

European student-policy dialogue: Establish structured exchanges between student representatives, education ministries and European institutions.

Comparative education monitoring: Develop shared indicators covering school conditions, staffing, educational access and student wellbeing.

Teacher development partnerships: Expand eligible cooperation projects involving teacher-training institutions and school authorities.

Digital admissions cooperation: Facilitate exchanges on accessibility, transparency, data protection and the evaluation of digital admissions systems.

Cross-border research: Support research into the relationship between school resources, educational attainment, social inclusion and regional inequalities.

These initiatives would allow Member States to learn from one another without assuming that the same policy will produce identical results in every national context.

European cooperation on institutional responsiveness

The comparative dimension of Bahauddin Foizee’s analysis offers an additional area for European cooperation. Although the grievances in India and France concern different institutional and policy questions, his argument identifies a common governance issue: the relationship between public authority, accountability and citizen confidence.

European institutions could use existing cooperation frameworks to encourage comparative research into how Member States respond to public-service grievances, organise consultations and provide administrative remedies. This would not require the creation of a common European model for handling demonstrations or national political disputes. Rather, it would allow governments to identify effective practices in public communication, institutional transparency and citizen engagement.

A European exchange of practices could examine:

  • How public authorities communicate decisions affecting essential public services.
  • Whether consultation mechanisms provide meaningful opportunities for participation.
  • How complaints concerning administrative failures are investigated and resolved.
  • Whether authorities publish implementation progress and explanations for delays.
  • How peaceful civic participation is protected during periods of public tension.

Such cooperation would be consistent with the EU’s supporting role and could strengthen the evidence base for policies concerning democratic participation, social inclusion and public-service quality.

A coordinated response should make use of existing institutions and programmes rather than creating unnecessary new administrative structures.

European Commission

The Commission should coordinate relevant education-policy cooperation, identify potentially eligible funding opportunities and support comparative evaluation.

It should also clarify the limits of EU competence when communicating about national education disputes.

European Parliament

Parliament can scrutinise relevant EU expenditure, debate educational inequalities and examine the implications of protests for fundamental rights and democratic participation.

It can also encourage transparent reporting on the results of EU-supported education programmes.

Council of the European Union

The Council can facilitate cooperation between national education authorities, promote the exchange of effective practices and agree on common priorities within the existing treaty framework.

French government

France remains responsible for the organisation of its education system, national budgetary decisions, staffing policies, admissions reform and the implementation of domestic legislation.

Regional and local authorities

Regional and local bodies should identify school infrastructure requirements, implement eligible projects and maintain communication with students, teachers and families.

This institutional division would preserve national responsibility while enabling practical European support.

Strengthening the European accountability dimension

European institutions should consider institutional responsiveness as a complementary dimension of their existing work on educational quality, social inclusion and fundamental rights. Bahauddin Foizee’s analysis suggests that public confidence is influenced not only by the substantive outcome of government policies but also by whether authorities explain their decisions and provide meaningful opportunities for redress.

Within its existing powers, the European Commission could encourage the inclusion of institutional-responsiveness indicators in relevant comparative studies and cooperation programmes. The European Parliament could scrutinise whether EU-supported projects provide transparent information on expenditure and implementation. The Council could facilitate the exchange of national practices concerning student consultation and public-service accountability.

These activities should remain within the established division of competences. They would not authorise European institutions to direct French domestic policing, determine school staffing or take over national education administration. Their purpose would be to strengthen transparency and evidence-based cooperation.

The EU should adopt a phased approach built around existing programmes and clearly defined responsibilities.

TimeframeEU-level actionIntended outcome
First 6 monthsMap relevant existing funding opportunities and identify comparable education indicatorsClearer understanding of eligible support and national needs
6–12 monthsEncourage Member States to report comparable staffing and infrastructure dataImproved evidence on educational inequalities
12–18 monthsSupport eligible teacher-training, digital-education and school-improvement partnershipsStronger institutional cooperation and shared capacity
12–24 monthsExpand exchanges on admissions transparency and student participationBetter policy design and more accessible consultation
24–36 monthsEvaluate funded projects and compare outcomes across participating regionsEvidence on effectiveness and value for money

These are proposed policy milestones, not existing EU legal deadlines or confirmed funding commitments.

Performance indicators

A European monitoring framework should assess:

  • The number and value of eligible education projects supported.
  • The share of projects completed within their planned budgets and schedules.
  • Changes in teacher vacancies and retention in participating regions.
  • Improvements in school infrastructure and accessibility.
  • Changes in educational participation and completion.
  • The accessibility and transparency of admissions procedures.
  • Student participation in formal consultation mechanisms.
  • The publication of comparable data and independent evaluations.

The indicators should be designed to measure results rather than administrative activity alone.

Additional indicators on institutional trust and accountability

Building on Bahauddin Foizee’s analysis, the European monitoring framework should also consider whether public institutions demonstrate responsiveness to the concerns raised by students and other affected groups. This would complement existing educational and financial indicators without treating public confidence as a simple numerical measure.

Potential additional indicators include:

  • Publication of official responses to student consultation submissions.
  • Availability of accessible procedures for administrative complaints and appeals.
  • The proportion of funded education projects with publicly accessible progress reports.
  • Publication of explanations for significant implementation delays or changes.
  • Evidence of corrective action following identified administrative or infrastructure deficiencies.
  • Availability of transparent reporting on complaints concerning the treatment of demonstrators, subject to applicable legal requirements.

These indicators should be applied proportionately and with respect for national legal systems. Their purpose would be to assess institutional responsiveness and the availability of accountability mechanisms, not to establish a uniform European political-performance ranking.

Overstepping national competence

Direct EU prescriptions on national class sizes, curricula or staffing structures could exceed the Union’s supporting role in education.

Safeguard: Use cooperation, eligible funding, voluntary coordination and evidence-sharing within the treaties.

Duplication of existing programmes

Creating new initiatives without reviewing existing funding instruments could increase administrative costs.

Safeguard: Prioritise existing European Education Area, Erasmus+ and eligible cohesion-policy mechanisms.

Unequal access to EU funding

Regions with greater administrative capacity may be better positioned to prepare applications than communities with more severe infrastructure problems.

Safeguard: Provide technical assistance and ensure that application procedures are accessible to smaller and disadvantaged authorities.

Inconsistent measurement

Differences in national definitions could make comparisons misleading.

Safeguard: Develop shared definitions, document methodological differences and publish limitations alongside results.

Politicisation of fundamental rights

European institutions must avoid treating isolated incidents as evidence of a general national pattern without adequate documentation.

Safeguard: Base assessments on verified evidence, applicable law and transparent procedures.

Excessive administrative burdens

Additional reporting requirements could divert resources from teaching and school management.

Safeguard: Reuse existing administrative data wherever possible and keep reporting proportionate to the value of the funding or policy initiative.

Institutional distrust and ineffective consultation

A further risk identified through Bahauddin Foizee’s analysis is that public authorities may concentrate on containing demonstrations without adequately addressing the underlying concerns. If citizens perceive consultation mechanisms as ineffective or believe that administrative complaints cannot produce meaningful responses, public confidence may weaken further.

Safeguard: Encourage transparent consultation procedures, published institutional responses, accessible administrative remedies and regular reporting on the implementation of public commitments. European institutions should promote these practices through existing cooperation mechanisms while respecting national competence.

Overemphasis on public-order indicators

Measuring the success of government responses primarily through reduced demonstrations, arrests or the restoration of normal operations could provide an incomplete picture of institutional performance. A decline in public disruption does not necessarily establish that the grievances behind a protest have been resolved.

Safeguard: Evaluate public-order outcomes alongside educational improvements, protection of peaceful assembly, institutional accountability and progress in addressing documented public-service deficiencies. These dimensions should be assessed separately rather than treated as interchangeable measures of success.

France’s student protests highlight issues that are relevant to the European Union’s broader objectives of educational quality, social inclusion, skills development and democratic participation.

The EU cannot directly manage France’s school system, determine its national education budget or replace the responsibilities of French authorities. It can, however, support cooperation, facilitate eligible investment, strengthen comparative evidence and promote the exchange of effective policies.

The most useful European response would combine three elements.

First, educational cooperation should focus on measurable improvements in staffing, infrastructure, access and learning conditions. Second, European funding should be linked to transparent implementation and credible evaluation. Third, democratic participation and fundamental-rights safeguards should remain integral to the response to public demonstrations.

Institutional trust as a wider European policy objective

The additional institutional dimension of this report draws on Bahauddin Foizee’s article, “In Delhi or Paris, restoring order cannot replace public trust,” published by Asia Times. Foizee argues that the authority to maintain public order does not, by itself, resolve the grievances that bring citizens into the streets. His analysis places institutional accountability, responsiveness and public confidence alongside the immediate operational responsibilities of governments.

For the European Union, this argument reinforces the importance of maintaining a distinction between national authority and institutional credibility. Member States retain responsibility for their education systems and public-order arrangements, but the effectiveness of their responses should also be considered in terms of transparency, access to remedies and meaningful public engagement.

European cooperation should therefore go beyond comparing educational expenditure and administrative outputs. It should also encourage institutions to demonstrate how decisions are made, how concerns are examined and how identified shortcomings are corrected. This does not require a transfer of national powers to the EU. It requires a stronger emphasis on accountability within the existing European framework.

The distinction between restoring order and restoring confidence is particularly important in democratic societies. Public demonstrations may end without every underlying grievance having been resolved. Conversely, the existence of demonstrations does not necessarily mean that public institutions have ceased to function. The relevant policy question is whether institutions remain capable of listening, explaining their decisions and responding appropriately to legitimate concerns.

For the EU, this offers a broader lesson for its work on social cohesion, education and democratic participation: effective public governance requires not only the exercise of lawful authority but also the capacity to demonstrate accountability and responsiveness.

A coordinated European approach should therefore combine respect for national competence with stronger institutional accountability, measurable educational improvements and the protection of democratic rights. Its success should ultimately be assessed through demonstrable improvements in educational opportunity, the effective use of public resources and public confidence in institutional decision-making.

John Bruton: A Statesman of Substance

When news broke in February 2024 of John Bruton’s passing, the tributes were swift and sincere. Politicians from across Ireland and Europe spoke not just of a former Taoiseach, but of a statesman — a man who believed that public service was about humility, dialogue and getting things done. For many, it was a reminder of a different kind of politics — and a different kind of politician.

Bruton’s career began early. Elected to Dáil Éireann in 1969 at the age of 22, he quickly stood out — not for grandstanding, but for his discipline, intelligence and quiet ambition. A Fine Gael TD from Meath, Bruton was shaped by conservative values, yet he consistently showed a willingness to adapt and evolve with the country he served. He took on a series of senior roles throughout the 1980s, including Minister for Finance, where he managed public finances during one of Ireland’s most difficult economic periods.

But it was his time as Taoiseach, from 1994 to 1997, that would define his public legacy. Leading a rare “Rainbow Coalition” of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left, Bruton defied expectations. The government, initially seen as a temporary arrangement, instead brought a period of real stability and progress. During his tenure, Ireland’s economy surged, setting the stage for the Celtic Tiger years that followed. Growth hit double digits. Investment flowed in. Unemployment dropped. And though the boom had multiple architects, Bruton’s steady stewardship helped lay the foundation.

He was also willing to take political risks on matters of principle. In 1995, his government led the way on a divisive but historic referendum that ended Ireland’s constitutional ban on divorce. The campaign was bitter and deeply emotional, but Bruton never wavered in his support. The measure passed by the narrowest of margins, marking a turning point in Ireland’s slow but steady shift toward a more socially liberal society.

Beyond the economy and social reform, Bruton’s quiet diplomacy played a crucial role in Northern Ireland. Working alongside British Prime Minister John Major, he helped launch the 1995 Anglo-Irish Framework Document — an effort to lay down principles for peace and political cooperation. While he would not be in office by the time the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998, many credited Bruton with creating conditions that made it possible. He insisted on engagement, on dialogue, on recognizing the legitimacy of both unionist and nationalist perspectives — a rare and necessary balance.

After his time as Taoiseach, Bruton continued to serve on the international stage. In 2004, he was appointed as the European Union’s ambassador to the United States. During a period of strained transatlantic relations, he became a persuasive advocate for European values, making the case for cooperation over confrontation. Bruton brought his usual clarity and calm to the role, earning respect across Washington’s political divide.

Even after stepping away from public office, he remained an active thinker and writer. His blog—thoughtful, wide-ranging and occasionally pointed—offered reflections on everything from history and governance to climate change and European integration. It became something of a hidden gem among Irish political observers, not because it was flashy, but because it felt honest.

When he died at the age of 76, the reaction was heartfelt. President Michael D. Higgins called him “a man of deep integrity and enduring commitment to the values of public service.” Former British Prime Minister John Major praised his “calm but determined” contribution to peace. Across political lines, there was agreement: John Bruton had been a steady hand at key moments in Irish history, a leader who avoided the drama but delivered the results.

In many ways, Bruton’s legacy is the kind that’s easy to overlook in an age dominated by noise and spectacle. He didn’t command attention, he earned it. He wasn’t out to change everything, just to improve what he could, when he could. That kind of leadership doesn’t always make headlines, but in Ireland’s story, it matters deeply. And in John Bruton’s case, it endures.

EU Cuts Eurozone Growth Forecast

Swift spread of Omicron, rising inflation and persistent supply-chain disruptions have chilled Europe’s economy this winter.

AFP, Brussels


The eurozone economy will grow less than expected this year, the European Commission said on Thursday, as energy prices and supply chain problems jack up inflation and delay a more sustained recovery from the pandemic.

The EU executive said GDP in the single currency bloc would grow by 4.0 per cent this year, instead of the 4.3 per cent forecast only three months ago.

Inflation would increase to a much stronger than expected 3.5 per cent in 2022.

“Multiple headwinds have chilled Europe’s economy this winter: the swift spread of Omicron, a further rise in inflation driven by soaring energy prices and persistent supply-chain disruptions,” said EU economy commissioner Paolo Gentiloni.

The high prices “are likely to remain strong until the summer, after which inflation is projected to decline as growth in energy prices moderates and supply bottlenecks ease,” he added. However, the former Italian prime minister underlined that “uncertainty and risks remain high” with the EU warning that “geopolitical tensions” in eastern Europe had “markedly aggravated” potential threats to the economy.

This was in reference to the more than 100,000 Russian troops that are deployed on the border with Ukraine, raising Western fears of a possible attack.

The crisis has brought major uncertainty over the supply of energy from Russia, which accounts for roughly 40 per cent of the gas that heats homes and powers factories in the 27-member EU. “Apparently Russia has no interest in increasing supplies right now, despite peak prices,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a video address to a business conference in Brussels.


EU to Make $21m Climate-Smart Investment in South Asia

The five-year programme (2021-2026) could help spur investments in energy, water, waste management, transport, logistics, and green buildings to benefit people and businesses in six South Asian countries.

The European Union is set to allocate a fund of $21.5 million to help accelerate climate-smart and inclusive infrastructure investments in Bangladesh and five other South Asian countries.

The five other countries are India, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, according to a press release of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the largest global development institution, yesterday.

The IFC will implement the project under the programme, “Accelerating Climate-Smart and Inclusive Infrastructure in South Asia (ACSIIS)”.

The ACSIIS is a five-year programme (2021-2026) to help spur investments in energy, water, waste management, transport, logistics, and green buildings to benefit people and businesses in Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. It would leverage $850 million of private sector investments in the region.

The impact of Covid-19 on investments in infrastructure has been widespread and severe. Investment commitments in infrastructure with private participation in 2020 dropped by an unprecedented 52 per cent from 2019 levels, said the IFC in the press release.

The IFC estimates that South Asian countries can unlock more than $3 trillion of climate-smart investment opportunities by fully meeting the national targets under the Paris Agreement by 2030.

“Attracting private capital for climate-smart infrastructure in a sustainable and inclusive manner will be critical for post-Covid-19 recovery in South Asia,” said Hector Gomez Ang, regional director for South Asia at the IFC.

“The EU’s support for the programme could not come at a better time as it is vital to act now to unblock obstacles to spurring sustainable infrastructure projects. This programme will leverage IFC’s experience and expertise in supporting climate-smart infrastructure development in the region,” he added.

The programme will also support the development of climate-smart investments in agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, health, and education while focusing on key themes such as cities, gender, and green finance.

The latest initiative builds on the IFC’s previous partnership with the EU to support the Eco-Cities Programme in India and other programmes in the region.


Brexit Entering Dramatic Second Act

Can a chaotic “Crash Out” Brexit in December 2020 be avoided?


John Bruton | Oped Column Syndication


“Let’s get Brexit done” is Boris Johnson’s election slogan. His implication is that, once he gets a working parliamentary majority to ratify his revised Withdrawal Treaty, Brexit will be quickly done and dusted.

This is over optimistic, to put it mildly.

There are three realistic outcomes to the Election: a Tory majority ( the most likely scenario at this stage), a Labour led government with the support of other parties, or a  hung Parliament in which no one can command a majority and form a government.

Even if Boris Johnson wins a majority, to get Brexit done he will still have to conclude a very complex trade negotiation with the EU, within an almost impossibly tight self imposed time line, by December 2020 (the end of the post Withdrawal Transition period).

He has tied himself be a commitment to Nigel Farage that there will be no extension of the December 2020 deadline. This is how he got the Brexit Party withdrew its candidates in all Tory held constituencies.

Reneging on that promise, because the negotiation need more time, would be costly for Boris Johnson, especially as it would  also extend the period in which the UK would have to continue contributing to EU funds.

If he were to change his mind and look for an extension of the post Withdrawal transition period beyond 2020, he will have to give notice of this by July of next year. The Withdrawal Treaty (Article 132) only allows for one extension of either one or two years. This is different from Article 50 extensions on which there is no legal limit.

If the deal is not done before the end of the (very short) transition period, then the UK crashes out of the EU with no deal at all. Remember this Trade deal will have to be ratified in the parliaments of all the EU member states, unlike the Withdrawal deal which only needed ratification by the European Parliament. So a crash out/no deal scenario is a major risk.

The implications of this for Ireland, and for the UK itself would be grave.

This is only one scenario, the Tory majority scenario. The other  scenario concerns  what happens if Boris Johnson fails to get a majority.

Obviously if he fails , the next steps will  have to be decided by a replacement government. But who will head such a government, and what will be their Brexit policy? Neither question can be answered at this stage.

It is unlikely that Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party can have a majority on its own.  But Labour might be able to form a majority with support from the Scottish National Party, in return for a pledge to hold a referendum on Scottish independence.

Another possibility is that Labour could make an arrangement with the Liberal Democrats, but they would want a Prime Minister other than Jeremy Corbyn.

That could happen. If a majority of MPs said, in writing, that they wanted as Prime Minister, an alternative named Labour Party MP, not the leader , the Queen would call on that MP to form a government.

Either of these Labour led alternative governments would hold another referendum on Brexit . It might also seek amendments to the existing Withdrawal Treaty before holding that referendum.

This process would take a year or more to complete, so a lengthy extension of Article 50 would have to be sought. Meanwhile to UK would continue to contribute to EU funds.

All this would be quite messy, but it would be  preferable to a crash out, no deal, Brexit a year from now, which might occur if a majority Tory government were to make unrealistic trade demands of the EU.

A third possibility is that no potential Prime Minister could be assured of a majority in Parliament. Given that the UK now has a 5 party system, rather than the 2 party one it had for the past century, this is a real possibility. The Fixed Term Parliament Act requires the calling of another Election, 14 days after a no confidence vote, if no  government can secure the confidence of Parliament within those 14 days.

But let’s acknowledge that, at the moment, the most likely outcome is a Tory majority government. What happens when it proceeds to implement the revised Withdrawal Agreement and negotiate a Free Trade Agreement(FTA) with the EU?

Given that the new Tory Parliamentary Party will be more radically pro Brexit than the old one, the UK negotiating position on the FTA   could be very demanding and very difficult for the EU to accept. Some of the new Tory MPs might even prefer a “no deal” on ideological grounds.

Before negotiations with the UK begin, the EU side will have to secure a negotiating mandate from the 27 member states.

This will not be easy. Many states will have sensitive issues vis a vis the UK, for example: fisheries for Spain, agriculture for France, rules of origin for all members, and, crucially,  the maintenance of a level playing field for competition between firms inside the EU and those in the UK.

Boris Johnson has said that, for him, the UK being able to have different environmental, social and product standards is the “whole point “of Brexit.

There are real fears that UK would try to undercut the EU in these fields.

So the EU will demand firm justiciable guarantees in the FTA that this will not happen. They will not take anything on trust. They will want a court to decide.

Likewise, the EU will want justiciable guarantees that the UK will not give subsidies to its industries, of a kind that would not be permitted in the EU.

The EU demand of binding arbitration will raise an allergic issue for Brexiteers.  The idea, that a “foreign court” might tell them what to do, is anathema to them.

If that is not agreed, it is hard to see how the EU could give up the possibility of introducing tariffs on UK exports to the EU, to level up the playing field.

Similar problems arise for agriculture and fisheries. The UK needs to decide what sort of farm policies it will have and if these will depart radically from EU norms.

If the UK tries to stop access for EU trawlers to its fishing grounds, it cannot expect tariff free access to EU markets for UK fish exports. Physical confrontations at sea are a real possibility.

There will also have to be a negotiation about cooperation between UK and Europol, and about money laundering.

The position of Norway, will have to be considered. It contributes to EU funds in return for access to the Single Market. The UK cannot expect more, for a lesser contribution, than Norway makes.

The position of countries like Japan and Canada, who have trade agreements with the EU, will have to be considered. They will look for any concessions the UK is given, other things being equal.

The earliest that the two sides would even be ready to start negotiating these difficult questions would be March 2020. On that basis, it is hard to see how it could all be wrapped up by December of next year.

Remember the Canada Agreement with the EU took eight YEARS to negotiate, and the political atmosphere between Canada was much better, and the stakes much less, than is now the case between the UK and the EU.

Brexit is far from done. It is entering its dramatic second Act.


John Bruton is the former Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland  (1994-97) and the former European Union Ambassador to the United States (2004-09). He has held several important offices in Irish government, including Minister for Finance, Minister for Industry & Energy, and Minister for Trade, Commerce & Tourism.


In Europe, the Era of Easy Decisions is Over

The EU’s strategic weight in the world will be reduced by the absence of the UK, as the EU is losing a relatively young, diverse and creative member state. 

[John Bruton | Oped Column Syndication]


Make no mistake about it, the latest version of Brexit is a very hard Brexit. The UK Government has abandoned the legally binding commitment in the previous deal to align with EU regulatory standards to the greatest extent possible. That is now dropped in favour of a political aspiration.

The more the United Kingdom diverges from the European Union standards the greater is the likelihood that the EU will have to place tariff and other barriers in the way of UK imports to the EU, and now also to Northern Ireland. The problem will be particularly acute for agricultural goods.

The EU/UK trade negotiation has yet to begin, but I believe it will be both lengthy and difficult. This is a direct result of the “red lines” for Brexit chosen by the UK (no custom union membership, no single market membership and no European Court of Justice jurisdiction). This was a legitimate choice for the UK to make, but the costs of the choice are yet to be revealed and understood. When they are, it will be too late to change course.

Many in the UK say they just want to “get Brexit over with”. The impatience is understandable, but the truth is that agreeing the Withdrawal Treaty will not actually get Brexit “over with”. The additional bureaucracy will be permanent. If there is not to be a no deal crash out, the transition period will have to be much long than the end of 2020, because the trade negotiation will only be in its early stages by then.

The only way to get  the agony of Brexit over with, would be to revoke Brexit. There is little popular support for that, so Brexit will drag on and preoccupy British politics for years.

By choosing a harder Brexit than Mrs May, and agreeing that the controls will be in the Irish sea, Boris Johnson has chosen to prioritize the interests of  hardline Brexiteers in England over the interests of the DUP in Northern Ireland. Such a choice was inherent in Brexit, which is why it will remain a puzzle for historians to discern why the DUP chose to support Brexit with such enthusiasm in the first place.

THE WORLD AFTER BREXIT

I would like to turn now to the world after Brexit, and about the European Union, of which we will continue to be a member and in whose success we will now have a disproportionate interest.

The world has become a much more unpredictable place than it was 10 years ago.

The era of easy decisions may be over.

A European country, Ukraine, has been successfully invaded by it neighbour, Russia, breaking solemn undertakings that had been given. We have been reminded of the importance of defence.

There is widespread evidence of interference in elections and democratic processes by authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world. Voting software is being infected. Campaigns are being hacked. National rules on election spending can be circumvented via the social media.

The United States has created doubt around its defence commitments to Europe. It has walked away from its Kurdish allies in Syria, and Europe was not able to fill the gap, although the refugees from that conflict are more likely to end up in Europe than in America. In fact Europe is dependent on Turkey and North Africa to curb mass migration to the southern shores of the EU.

The EU has not developed a migration policy, which, if properly organised , could bring dynamism to our continent to compensate for the loss of dynamism that will inevitably flow from the ageing of the native European population.

The US is undermining the rules based international order in the field of trade. It is refusing to allow the appointment of replacement judges to the WTO’s appellate court, which will soon lead to that court ceasing to function. This is happening just at the time that our nearest neighbour may find itself relying on the WTO once its post Brexit transition period expires.

THE RISE OF CHINA

China is returning to the dominant position it held in the world economy in the two millennia up to 1800.

It is doing this on the strength of its human capital, not its physical capital. It is educating more engineers that the US and the EU combined.

It is doing it through its competitive and  innovative firms, not through its monopolistic state enterprises. Chinese R and D spending will exceed US Rand D this year and far exceeds EU R and D.

It is ahead of everyone in 5G communications, at the time the world economy is becoming ever more digital.

Chinese firms own Volvo, Pirelli and recently bought the firms supplying robots to the German car industry. EU could not buy the equivalent Chinese firms.

Chinese military spending exceeds that of all EU states combined and is already half that of the US.

If the US thinks it can use trade policy to arrest Chinese development, it is probably making a mistake.

But the US is right to insist on fair competition. China must be treated in the WTO as a developed country, and not get concessions intended for much poorer countries.

In its response to the Chinese challenge, the EU should maintain its robust competition policy and should not try to pick industrial winners from Brussels.

THE RESPONSE OF EUROPE

Europe would be much better placed to defend its own interests, and to act as a balancing power in the world, if the euro functioned as a global reserve currency.

To achieve that, we need to create a Capital Markets Union and complete the Banking Union. This requires a harmonisation of company insolvency rules throughout the EU or the Eurozone.

The Eurozone must have a capacity to cope with localized shocks and to prevent contagion.  We need viable proposals for a Eurozone wide reinsurance of bank deposits, and Eurozone wide reinsurance of the unemployment  benefit systems of member states..

BREXIT IS A SETBACK FOR EUROPE……..STAGNATION MUST BE AVOIDED

There is no doubt but Brexit has been a setback for Europe.

True, the EU had maintained its unity and stability, in stark contrast to the way in which the UK system has been convulsed by the divorce. But that does not take away from the fact that we are losing a relatively young, diverse and creative member state.

The EU’s strategic weight in the world will be reduced by the absence of the UK.

The population of the remaining members of the  EU are, in global terms, relatively elderly, pessimistic and risk averse. This could lead the EU to make big mistakes.

I give some examples of this.

Many member states refuse even to contemplate the amendment of the EU Treaties because of the risk of defeats in referenda. If that remains the attitude, the EU will simply stagnate. Every successful human organisation must have the capacity to change its rules if this is demonstrably necessary. The US is unable to amend its constitution and we can see the problems that has led to.

Unlike the US, the EU has been able to attract and accommodate new member states over the last 50 years. At last week’s Summit, France the Netherlands and Denmark blocked the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia even though that country has done everything the EU asked to qualify, even changing its name, which was a highly sensitive matter.

The fact that this rejectionism was led by President Macron, who makes great speeches about European integration, is particularly disquieting. I hope he changes his mind. Yes, we need tougher means of ensuring that the rule of law in respected in the most rigorous way but that could have been dealt with in the negotiations with North Macedonia, which would have gone on for years any way.

THE SINGLE MARKET

We must defend the integrity of the EU Single Market, at the borders of the European Union and throughout its territory.

Ireland must be seen to be, fully compliant with EU Single Market rules. Otherwise Ireland’s geographic position will be used against it by competitors for the investment.

The EU Single Market is not complete. There is much more to do.

An April 2019 Study “Mapping the Cost of non Europe” estimated that

  • completing the  classic single market would add  713 billion euros to the EU economy.
  • completing Economic and Monetary Union would add a further 322 billion, and
  • completing a digital single market a further  178 billion euros.

A more integrated energy market would save a further 231 billion and a more integrated EU approach to fighting organised crime would be worth 82 billion.

Cross border VAT fraud is costing 40 billion. This will be an area of special concern in regard to traffic between Britain and Northern Ireland.

These are some of the reasons why we must complete the Single Market.

Services account for three quarters of EU GDP.

But  we have been very slow in creating a single EU market for services.

In the field of Services, only one legislative proposal had been adopted during the term of the outgoing Commission, a proportionality test for new regulations on professions.

All other proposals are blocked.

I think that a major obstacle is vested interests in national or regional governments, who do not want to give up power.

By completing the Single Market, the EU can show that it has much more to offer to the world than a post Brexit Britain.

To help complete the Single Market, Ireland should be open to qualified majority voting on energy and climate matters.

We should also be open to carefully defined individual amendments to the EU Treaties if they can be shown to the public to deliver real benefits.

A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

The existing Withdrawal Agreement protects UK environmental, product and labour standards, in a way that a mere Trade Agreement will never do.

In any trade negotiation with a post Brexit Britain, maintaining a level competitive playing field will be vital.

No subsidies, no cartels, and no undercutting of EU standards must be insisted upon.

Likewise the UK must not be allowed to undercut the EU on worker protection, environmental and product quality standards. The UK will have to set up bureaucracies to devise and enforce UK standards. 200 EU environmental laws will have to be replaced by the UK. Westminster will be busy.

EU WIDE DEMOCRACY

It is over 40 years since the first European Parliament election.

While the  EP elections are hotly contested, the contests are often really about national issues.

A genuine EU wide debate does not take place, because the elections are confined within in national constituencies. An EU “polis” or public opinion has not yet been created.

My own view is that the President of the Commission should be elected separately from the Parliament, using a system of proportional representation (PR).

We must have strong national democracy if we are to have a strong EU, and we must have strong national democracy if we are to have strong states.

There are remarkable differences in the level of confidence people in Europe feel in their own national democracy. According to a recent Pew Poll, 72% of Swedes have confidence in how their national democracy works. Within the Netherlands confidence in their system was  68%, in Poland it was 61% and in Germany 65%.

But , at the other end of the spectrum, only  31% of British, and 32% of Spaniards and Italians had confidence in their own democratic systems.

To build confidence in the EU, we also need to rebuild confidence in democracy itself, at every level of governance.


John Bruton is the former Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland  (1994-97) and the former European Union Ambassador to the United States (2004-09). He has held several important offices in Irish government, including Minister for Finance, Minister for Industry & Energy, and Minister for Trade, Commerce & Tourism.


Ukraine: Recent Election and EU Membership

Ukrainian leaders are using the goal of EU membership as the spur to get their voters to accept uncomfortable reforms.

[John Bruton | Oped Column Syndication]


The desire for free and fair elections, through which politicians can be held to account, is widespread in the former Communist world.  We have seen this with the arrest in Moscow of over 1000 people, demonstrating against the arbitrary disqualification of candidates for local elections in the city of Moscow, including of a candidate who won 27% of the vote in the last  election.

Corrupting elections was part of the armoury of the Soviet state, and it is a habit that has persisted, long after Communism itself has fallen .

After the more hopeful Yeltsin years, Russia, the biggest Republic of the former Soviet Union, is reverting to Soviet electoral habits. But the second biggest former Soviet Republic, Ukraine, is taking a  very different course.

Recent free and fair elections in Ukraine are undoubtedly being watched closely by opposition figures in Russia.

If Ukraine can make a successful democratic transition, it becomes harder for President Putin to argue that Russia must retain a more authoritarian system. Another neighbour of Ukraine, Viktor Orban of Hungary, will also have to take note.

I have recently had the opportunity of spending a week in Ukraine, as one of a large number of international observers of their Parliamentary Election on 21 July.

The consensus among observers was that these Elections, called early by the newly elected President Zelensky, were both free and fair.

Votes  in Ukraine are cast in secret, and when the polls close, are counted openly, in the local polling stations themselves. From my observation, these tasks were carried out conscientiously and transparently.

This is not to say that Ukrainian democracy is free of problems.

On a per capita basis , Ukraine is the poorest country in Europe. Even Moldova is slightly better off. The country’s growth rate is well below potential.

The country is at war, a war that has cost 13000 lives so far. In response to Russian armed interference, Ukraine has had to develop a large army of its own, almost from scratch.

Yet it depends for income, on transit fees for Russian gas, being piped through Ukraine to customers in the EU. Its  public finances are not in good order, it has had to get help from the IMF, and has had to increase fuel prices to its own citizens as part of the IMF programme.

Like many former Communist states, including ones already in the EU, it suffers from endemic corruption.

Fighting corruption is one of the goals of the new President. He is handicapped in this effort by the lack of a professional non political civil service, and  of an independent, properly resourced, courts system. These deficiencies inhibit foreign direct investment, because investors need to know honest and efficient courts will be there to protect their legal rights, before they put their money at risk

MPs are immune from legal proceedings while serving as MPs, and this privilege has attracted some people into politics in pursuit of their private interests, rather than the public good. The President has promised to end this immunity, but he has got to get the MPs to vote for this.

While the election itself was free and fair, the television coverage of the campaign was not. Ukrainians rely heavily on television to inform themselves about politics. Television stations tend to be controlled by rival oligarchs, and these oligarchs often are politicians in their own right. Rules requiring balanced coverage during election campaigns are not properly enforced.

Ukraine has an Association Agreement with the EU, which is described as “the most ambitious the EU has with any non EU member state”. Indeed this agreement may serve as a model for a future UK Agreement with the EU, whenever the tortuous Brexit process in concluded.

But there are clear signs that Ukrainians will not be satisfied , in the long run, with a mere Association Agreement with the EU, however ambitious it may be. Their goal is to be a full voting member state of the EU.  When they signed the EU Association Agreement, they rejected President Putin’s offer to join his proposed Eurasian Union. Indeed it was that rejection that triggered the Russian invasion of Crimea and of parts of eastern Ukraine. So, Ukraine has paid a high price for its EU choice.

It also is a very big country, with over 40 million people.

It may have been a privileged “vassal”, or first daughter, of the Russian Empire in the past. But it has decided to turn its back on  that and has set itself the goal of joining the EU instead, and not in a secondary role. Its leaders are using the goal of EU membership as the spur to get their voters to accept uncomfortable reforms.

But the prospect, however long term, of EU membership for Ukraine is far from simple for the EU.

In 2001, the EU enlarged itself very quickly and took in many new member states in central and eastern Europe. Some of these countries had unresolved  post Communist problems of the kind still besetting Ukraine…corruption, weak courts, poor public administration, organised crime and oligarchical control of the media.

The EU is, in its essence, a set of uniform rules, on the basis of which its citizens enjoy freedoms across a whole continent. But, if the enforcement of these rules can be corrupted through weak or politicised courts or by bad administration, these EU wide freedoms cease to mean anything.

So until the EU is satisfied it has got on top of  the corruption and rule of law problems it already has among  some of its own existing members, like Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, it will be very  slow in admitting new members, like Ukraine, where the same problems are unresolved.

The EU is in a stronger position to insist of high standards in a country, like Ukraine, which is still looking for membership. It is harder to insist with countries that are already full voting members of the club.  Existing members can and will used their votes in the Council of Ministers to block EU sanctions for rule of law, or related, breaches of EU standards.

Getting these rule of law issues right will be the number one priority of the new Von der Leyen Commission, even ahead of Brexit.

Until it does that, the EU cannot credibly offer hope of membership to countries like Ukraine, Northern Macedonia and Albania. Without such hope, these countries could turn away from the EU,  and other global players, such as China, Turkey or Russia, could take the EU’s place.


John Bruton is the former Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland  (1994-97) and the former European Union Ambassador to the United States (2004-09). He has held several important offices in Irish government, including Minister for Finance, Minister for Industry & Energy, and Minister for Trade, Commerce & Tourism.


Brexit: Irish Border and Britain’s Fantasy of Taking Back Control

The burden of history is weighing heavily on Britain as it battles with its fantasies of “taking back control.”

[Lyndall Stein| Fair Observer]


The Republic of Ireland has been an enthusiastic member of the European Union since 1973, having both gained and given so much from being part of the EU. In the toxic mayhem of Brexit Britain, one question is perhaps more confounding than most, namely how did the Irish backstop issue emerge as a surprising problem? How could Ireland, with a population of just 4.8 million, have the power to impede the mighty British plan to cut the cord to the EU — a union that the Brexiters have reimagined as a cruel oppressive colonizer?

British rule has cast a long shadow over Ireland. Now 27 EU countries, large and small, are defending the Irish Republic’s right to maintain a frictionless and open border with Northern Ireland, as mandated by the historic Good Friday Agreement. Why did no one seem to see the issue of the Irish border spoiling all the little Englander plans for their new small-island world? How did it come to be a surprise, with 800 years of painful history to muse on?

SEA OF BLOOD

The problem is that in looking back to a supposedly glorious past in “taking back control,” the British are looking back at a legacy that was built on a sea of blood and injustice. It is a history of cruelty, exploitation and neglect. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the wholesale colonization of Ireland accelerated as land was stolen from the Irish people, who were punished for using their own language, forbidden to own land and denied any political rights. Catholics experienced discrimination in every aspect of their lives. A system of vassalage reduced the rural poor to tiny plots of barren land, obliged to pay extortionate rents to local and absentee landlords in England.

To this day, the population of Ireland has not recovered from the human destruction of the great famine of 1845-49 when the potato harvest failed. Potatoes constituted the main diet of the impoverished rural communities, and while butter, cheese and wheat continued to be exported, and a wide range of food was available, the rural poor were left to die in terrible circumstances. The landlords showed no mercy for the starving population, the famine largely ignored by the British ruling class. A million died and a million emigrated, with the population falling by 25% within a decade. The pain and horror of this disaster for the people of Ireland was a powerful driver for their determination to fight for independence and still resonates today.

Over many years after the famine, successive waves of resistance and struggle for independence continued, culminating in the 1916 Easter Rising, during which a republic was proclaimed by the leaders of the rebellion against colonial rule. In the British reprisals that followed, the rebel leaders were court-martialed and executed, and hundreds were killed. The severity of the backlash heightened the Irish people’s determination to free themselves and increased support for the republican Sinn Féin party, which won decisively in the general election of 1918, gaining 73 out of a 105 seats reserved for Ireland in for the House of Commons. Sinn Fein were not prepared to take their seats in Westminster — and refuse to this day — and set up an alternative government in Ireland, the first Dail Eireann.

The British government, however, refused to honor the results of the election, and the unionists in the north of Ireland threatened violence. The War of Independence started in 1919, lasting until 1921, when a truce was called. The result was the partitioning of Ireland and the creation of the Irish Free State, which had control of 26 of the island’s 32 counties. In 1948 it was renamed the Republic of Ireland, though this was contended by those who believed the republic should include the whole of Ireland. The six counties of the north  became Northern Ireland. A border with no historical or geographical relevance was created to maintain a unionist majority in the six counties of the wealthier industrialized north, which then continued to be ruled by Britain as Northern Ireland and as part of the United Kingdom.

The unionists then maintained power through the next eight decades by gerrymandering, discrimination in housing, in the workplace and at the ballot box. The most basic principles of democracy and enfranchisement were absent. This was subsequently challenged by the civil rights protests of the late 1960s. The violent response to these peaceful protests, including the murder of innocent civilians in the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry, Northern Ireland, in 1972, escalated into a decades-long armed conflict between the British government and the Irish Republican Army, the IRA. The Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 with immense effort across the whole of Ireland and the United Kingdom, with international mediation. It is founded on key principles including an open border with the republic — which is now threatened by Brexit.

ARBITRARY BORDERS

The policy of imposing arbitrary borders, created to solve the problems caused by colonial rule, was a model the British followed with disastrous results, leaving a legacy of pain and conflict to this day — in places like India, Pakistan, Palestine and Nigeria. Nearly a quarter of the world was once under the extractive and rapacious rule of the British Empire, at its height before the Second World War. The gentle pink of the maps did not show what was stolen, how many died — how culture, history and heritage were denied.

Ireland’s place in the world, its success as an exporter of its rich culture — music, art, literature, technology and expertise — have all been given the opportunity to flower within the EU’s diverse trading block, built on the free movement of people and goods. Dublin has become an international, vibrant and dynamic city, with a lively and youthful culture that challenges the reactionary forces that have dominated Irish politics for so long. A modern, truly European and sophisticated country has emerged from the crushing impact of its past oppression. It has thrown off the shackles of the Catholic Church in recent years, voting for gay marriage and to end the country’s cruel anti-abortion law — the 8th Amendment that prevented all recourse to safe termination even if the price was the death of the mother.

These issues continue to divide neighboring Northern Ireland, with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which currently gives the Conservative government its parliamentary majority in Westminster, still clinging to fundamentalist attitudes toward women and the LGBTQ community. Northern Ireland voted overwhelmingly to remain in the European Union, but the DUP is committed to leaving the EU and remaining in the bitter past. It has been embroiled in corruption scandals like the “cash for ash” debacle that led to the collapse of the power-sharing agreement in Stormont, leaving Northern Ireland without a functioning government for over two years and counting.

Earlier this month, in the absence of a governing body, MPs in Westminster voted to extend rights to abortion and gay marriage to Northern Ireland.

The billions that were promised by Teresa May’s Conservatives to DUP leader Arlene Foster was a hopeless attempt at vote-buying in order to secure a working majority in the UK Parliament. The DUP’s attachment to its failing powers becomes narrow and blinkered in the context of the electoral successes of Sinn Féin across the whole of Ireland and the increasingly progressive changes that have transformed life in the republic.

TAKING, NOT GIVING

The British have a long history of wanting to continue to take from their erstwhile colonies but not being prepared to give back. They benefited, after the destruction of the Second World War, from the Caribbean immigrants who were encouraged to come here to provide desperately needed skills, only to cruelly reject these children of the Windrush generation who drove our buses, nursed our patients and helped rebuild our country. Despite the scandal, the National Health Service is once again recruiting Jamaican nurses to make for the shortfall in staff following the EU referendum vote.

Yes, curry may be Britain’s most popular national dish, but discrimination and the toxic impact of the UK Home Office’s policies have created a “hostile environment” fostered in the six years of Theresa May as secretary of state have continued under Amber Rudd and now Sajid Javid. We have seen so many cases of injustice and abuse, most recently with the withholding of visas to academics from Africa visiting the UK for vital work on issues such as the Ebola epidemic.

The initial stages of the attempt by the Home Office to manage the question of EU residents’ status post Brexit have been marked by incompetence, confusion and uncertainty, bearing the hallmarks of another episode of discrimination and hostility. The building of new barriers, a cornerstone of Brexit, will impoverish the United Kingdom and sow disunity and disorder, unpicking the fabric of our society built on a free movement for all — both for those who have brought their skills and talents from other countries in Europe and for British citizens who have chosen to retire in sunnier places or work in other countries on the continent.

Those of Irish heritage in the UK have flooded their embassy with requests for an Irish passport, allowing holders to continue to travel and work across Europe as free citizens. The rest of us will be in the slow queue, going backward.

The burden of history is weighing heavily on Britain as it battles with its fantasies of taking back control and the bizarre idea that a trading bloc is actually a cruel colonizing power. So many myths have taken hold, with Brexiters embracing victimhood. The real politics and history of the border between the republic and Northern Ireland, created by the colonial past, have somehow been forgotten along with the fragility of a hard-earned peace.

The idea that an Ireland it once totally controlled and exploited having any power over the mighty British bulldog seems an unreasonable reversal of fortunes, feeding the fantasy that Britain can return to its “glorious past” when it ruled the world, building its wealth and strength on the misery of others in countries both nearby and far away.

This article was originally published on Fair Observer.


Lyndall Stein is a leading authority in campaigning, fundraising and communications. She has the experience of working with Reprieve, New Economics Foundation, Care International UK, Concern Worldwide, BOND, Resource Alliance, ActionAid, Terrence Higgins Trust, African National Congress, Care International, The Big Issue, Practical Action, VSO, African Women’s Development Trust, SOS Children’s Villages, and Institute of Fundraising.


 

Irish Border Backstop until Reaching an Agreement on Alternatives

If the British alternatives to backstop are all that good, why can they not live with the backstop until the alternatives are agreed?

[John Bruton | Oped Column Syndication]


Boris Johnson recently said that there is an “abundance” of technical alternatives to the Irish Backstop. He added that “do or die” he would take the UK out of the EU by 31 October.

He seems to believe that he can, between now and the end of October, persuade the EU to have such confidence in these unspecified alternatives that they will not insist on keeping the backstop. This is unrealistic, to put it mildly.

First, he has not put forward any detailed alternative to the backstop.

Secondly, there is no way anything meaningful can be negotiated between the time Mr Johnson would become Prime Minister and the end of October. After its experience with the failure of the UK side to ratify proposals it had previously agreed, there is no disposition on the EU side to take things “on trust” from the UK. There is nothing necessarily personal about this. It is just common prudence.

All sides are agreed that the backstop is only a fall back provision to be used only if an alternative agreed solution cannot be found.

If Boris Johnson was as confident, as appears to be that abundant alternatives exist, he would accept the backstop as an interim step, until his replacement alternatives have been worked upon and agreed.

The fact that he is not prepared to do that makes one suspect that there are no ready or acceptable alternatives that would maintain open borders, and close North/South cooperation based on compatible regulations. The European Commission recently published a document outlining all the areas of life, from health care to transport, where acceptance of common EU standards enables the private and public sectors to cooperate on a cross border basis. Brexit, without a backstop, would tear all this up.

A 216 page document was published recently by Prosperity UK, setting out a possible alternative structure that might replace the backstop. They envisage that their proposal would be added as a protocol to the Withdrawal Agreement. This would require EU consent.

Its authors also admitted that more work was needed on their proposal. It is hardly likely to be ready, and agreed by the EU 27, before 31 October. So it does not solve the immediate problem and, in a sense, Boris Johnson’s recent commitment to leave, come what may, on 31 October means that Prosperity UK’s proposal could only be pursued if Jeremy Hunt becomes Prime Minister.

Prosperity UK proposes to have border related controls — not at the border itself, but on farms and in factories and warehouses instead.

But avoiding physical infrastructure on the border is only part of the Brexit problem.

The other problem is the extra costs, delays and bureaucracy that will be imposed by Brexit on all exchanges across the border within Ireland. These would actually be worse under Prosperity UK proposals, and smuggling will be even more likely than if the controls were on the border itself. And smuggling can be used to finance subversive activities, as we know.

To avoid checks on the border of the compliance with EU standards of food crossing from Northern Ireland, Prosperity UK proposes that, for food standards purposes, Ireland would leave the EU and join a Britain and Northern Ireland food standards union instead!

This idea has zero possibility of being accepted. It is naive. Irish agricultural policy would then be dictated by British interests, something Ireland escaped from when it joined the EU in 1973.

That said, the Prosperity UK report does acknowledge the “supremacy” of the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process. This is a good rhetorical starting point.

But no new thinking is offered as to how this supremacy would be reflected in future British policy in a post Brexit world.

One would have thought that those who do not like the backstop would come forward with new and interesting proposals to deepen North/South cooperation, and East/West cooperation, to compensate for the disruption that will inevitably flow from Brexit. That is where British negotiators should be putting the emphasis now. The idea that the Belfast Agreement structures can be frozen, by a refusal by the Democratic Unionist Party and/or Sinn Fein to work together, is not acceptable.

But at a deeper level, it seems that there is still no consensus in Britain as to the sort of relationship it wants with the EU, and what trade offs it is prepared to make to negotiate such a relationship. It seems that public opinion in the UK has not yet absorbed what leaving the EU means.

It wants the freedom but not to accept the costs.


John Bruton is the former Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland  (1994-97) and the former European Union Ambassador to the United States (2004-09). He has held several important offices in Irish government, including Minister for Finance, Minister for Industry & Energy, and Minister for Trade, Commerce & Tourism.


Europe Needs Common Long-Term Strategy for China

Addressing the challenges posed by Beijing requires European unity, as no member state alone has the resources and negotiating power necessary to deal with China on an equal footing.

[Lucrezia Poggetti | East Asia Forum]


China’s rise and its geopolitical ambitions have started to manifest more clearly inside Europe, making the need for a China strategy ever more compelling. European unity is key to effectively addressing the challenges posed by Beijing. After years of closer trade and investment ties, the European Union is realising that close economic relations with China have brought about political and security challenges it was not prepared for.

This newfound awareness is visible in the EU’s latest attempts to protect its strategic sectors and critical infrastructure. This includes the adoption of an EU framework for foreign investment screening and the issuing of guidelines for the security of Europe’s 5G networks.

The European Union has come to appreciate that it needs a strategy for China as, far from being solely an economic player, China is a rising political and security actor with geopolitical ambitions. This was evident in the European Commission’s ‘strategic outlook’ of March 2019, which informed EU leaders’ more assertive tone at the subsequent EU–China Summit in April 2019. Many observers have noticed Brussels’ unprecedented labelling of China as a ‘systemic rival’ and ‘economic competitor’. Less emphasis has been put on the European Union’s acknowledgment that China’s geopolitical goals ‘present security issues for the EU, already in a short- to mid-term perspective’. According to the strategic document, these are visible in China’s increasing military and technological advances and cross-sectoral hybrid threats such as information operations and large military exercises.

Addressing the challenges posed by Beijing requires European unity, as no member state alone has the resources and negotiating power necessary to deal with China on an equal footing. Paris and Berlin have demonstrated support for Brussels’ call for a ‘whole-of-EU’ approach vis-a-vis China, at least symbolically.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to France in March 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron invited European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to join his meeting with the Chinese leader. The German government also announced its intention to invite all member states to a 2020 EU–China Summit under its EU Presidency. This move raised eyebrows in Brussels, but Berlin hopes to encourage other members to pursue a common approach to China and refrain from Beijing-led ‘multi-bilateral’ talks.

However, governing elites in some European Union member states look at China through the prism of economic opportunity, downplaying the risks. They believe that close political ties with Beijing are key to unlocking greater economic opportunities, which cripples the EU’s efforts to devise a common strategy.

This approach is based on the naive assumption that politically cosying up to the Chinese leadership fosters a special relationship that translates into privileged economic treatment. Such an approach also assumes that a bilateral partnership on equal terms with China is possible. It disregards the fact that the Chinese government can retaliate any time, should it consider it necessary for its own agenda, regardless of whether memoranda, ‘strategic partnerships’ or any other agreements have been signed.

Lately, attempts to devise a coherent EU approach to China have not only hit a wall in Europe’s eastern flank — with the Chinese-led 16+1 grouping of Central and Eastern European countries expanding to 17+1 after welcoming Greece — but also at its core. In March 2019 Xi spent four days in Italy, where the country became the first EU founder and G7 state to officially endorse the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This is telling of a broader trend in which Europe criticises the growth of China’s global infrastructure scheme, and demands that the Initiative meet transparency and sustainability standards, while at the same time various European governments endorse the BRI.

Against this backdrop, how can the European Union ensure that its members look to China from a more long-term strategic perspective and act cohesively? An essential step is to close the knowledge and perception gaps across the continent. While it is up to national governments to increase their own countries’ expertise on China, the European Union can lead in driving debates about China’s rise and the implications for Europe. This would benefit those states where information about China is currently largely funded or driven by Beijing.

Democracies in China’s wider neighbourhood — like Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan — have been at the forefront of dealing with China’s systemic challenge. Exchanging notes with these partners would provide European countries with useful information on Chinese activities and response measures to adopt.

The recent 5G recommendations and the new investment screening mechanism show that a few concerted steps have been taken since 2016, when it became more visible that China’s influence was impacting European cohesion vis-a-vis Beijing. Allegedly, members of the China-led 16+1 grouping of Central and Eastern European countries also better coordinated their positions with Brussels in preparation for the latest Summit in Croatia.

The reshuffling of EU institutions that will result from the European Parliament elections raises questions over how Brussels will reshape current efforts into a more coherent and strategic approach towards China going forward. Beijing will likely try to use the opportunity offered by the upcoming changes in the EU administration to advance its interests. Securing European interests vis-a-vis China through a long-term common strategy is increasingly a necessity.

This article was originally published on East Asia Forum.


Lucrezia Poggetti is a Research Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Berlin.